The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
2. Requirements for the Data Source¶
Chapter: 01 File version: v2 (universalised) Date: 2026-06-11 · universalised 2026-09-15 Source: v6.53 §4, §5
An early-draft layer (note of 01.10.2026 after audit 040m). The council's right to raise the coefficient (§2.4) and the fixed multiplier 1.5 in the statute (§2.5) have been removed: the percentage is set and changed only by referendum. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
The formula in §1 rests on a single number: the jurisdiction's median wage. Where that number comes from determines the stability of the whole protocol — substitute the source and you can kill the mechanism without touching another line of the law (see §42). The source is therefore fixed in the statute alongside the coefficients.
2.1. Four requirements for the source¶
First — administrative reporting, not a survey. Only a source qualifies where the number arises from an employer's mandatory reporting to the state and is confirmed on both sides. A survey estimate of income does not qualify: once AB-EXIT exists, the respondent has a financial motive to overstate income and there is no penalty for doing so. Administrative reporting is not governed by that motive — understating income there is already an offence and already investigated, and AB-EXIT changes nothing about it.
Second — independence from the executive. The body publishing the median must not report to the person whose term depends on its size. A mayor, governor or minister can influence none of the formula's variables.
Third — regularity and verifiability. Publication on a fixed schedule, with an open methodology and the ability to cross-check against at least one independent statistical series.
Fourth — resilience to losing one source. Computation continues as long as at least one of several authorised bodies publishes income data. The protocol must not die because one agency closes.
2.2. What the source must count¶
Included: wages of salaried employees, bonuses, commissions — every form of compensation paid by an employer within the jurisdiction.
Excluded: pensions, state social payments, benefits, investment income, inheritance, alimony.
The logic of exclusion is single: the formula measures the net economic productivity of a territory — what is earned here and now, not what is transferred in. Include transfers and a perverse incentive appears: local government finds it more profitable to attract recipients of transfers than to create jobs. The dividend rises; the economy does not.
The self-employed. In most jurisdictions their income falls under a separate reporting regime and its median sits below the salaried one. Including the self-employed lowers the median; the 1.5 coefficient already carries an indirect correction, so no additional coefficient is needed.
2.3. The divergence rule¶
One source is designated primary, the others verifying. If the primary and any verifying source diverge by more than 10%, an independent audit is triggered automatically. The auditor is appointed by the judicial branch; results are public within 90 days.
2.4. K \= 1% (the dividend coefficient)¶
Amendment of 30.09.2026 (048k §3). 1 % is an illustration, not a norm. The percentage of the median is determined by open debate and a referendum; the council's power to raise it without a referendum is removed; it may be changed no more than once per cycle.
- Fixed in the statute
- The local representative body may raise it to 2% on two conditions: the previous cycle's savings exceed the cost of AB-EXIT threefold, and two-thirds of the body approve
- Above 2% — only by referendum with a two-thirds majority
- Below 1% — only by referendum
Why 1%: it can be computed in your head in two seconds (drop two zeros). It is universal across jurisdictions and currencies. "1%" is a brand, not merely a number.
2.5. 1.5 (the household coefficient)¶
- Converts the individual median into an approximate household median
- Average number of earners per household in developed economies: 1.3–1.7
- The coefficient 1.5 \= the midpoint
- Fixed in the statute
- Revisited once every ten years against the national census
The arithmetic, for a citizen: median 40,000 + half of it (20,000) \= 60,000. Drop two zeros \= 600. Three steps, five seconds, in any currency.
Country-specific implementation: which document actually satisfies these requirements is a question for the country, not the protocol. The American variant (Form W-2 via the SSA, five layers of data protection, the four-agency rule) is covered in §48b.