The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
23d. Democracy Vouchers: Public Money to the Citizen for His Own Political Decision¶
Chapter: 05 — Empirical Base File: 05_023d · v1 · 30 September 2026 (session 30.09.26) Source: the architect's decision "gather everything already in the repository into separate chapters"; consolidated from 016 (precedents of support) and 023 §23.2–23.3; the voting results and the court decision were checked on 30.09.2026.
1. Why a separate chapter¶
Democracy vouchers are the protocol's closest living relative in one respect: a city hands every resident money from the budget, and the resident decides what to do with it in politics. The repository mentions them twice, each time for another purpose. They are brought together here because this programme has what the protocol does not yet have: a victory at a referendum and a case won in court.
2. What happened¶
Seattle. In November 2015 voters adopted the citizens' initiative I-122, "Honest Elections" — about 63 % in favour. Every resident receives four vouchers of 25 dollars and may give them to candidates in city elections. The programme is paid for by a dedicated property levy of three million dollars a year. It was first used in 2017.
The court. Two property owners challenged the programme: their tax goes to support candidates they disagree with. On 11 July 2019 the Washington Supreme Court, in Elster v. City of Seattle, upheld the programme and rejected the free-speech argument. The petition to the US Supreme Court was not taken up.
Oakland. In November 2022, 73.9 % of voters adopted Measure W — 100 dollars in "democracy dollars" for every resident. The launch was delayed for lack of money in the city budget.
3. What the repository already says¶
- As a precedent of support (016): 63 % in Seattle and 74 % in Oakland voted for 100 dollars that a person gives to someone else's campaign; the protocol offers a larger sum to the person's own account — hence the estimate "75 % and above".
- As a reform with a measured effect (023 §23.2): the share of residents taking part in campaign financing rose from 1.5 to 4.4 %. On turnout and on populism — about zero.
4. The comparison¶
| Democracy vouchers | The protocol | |
|---|---|---|
| What the resident gets | the right to direct public money to a candidate | money to his own account |
| For what | for taking part in financing | for a declared exit from voting |
| Who ends up with the money | politicians | the citizen |
| The route of adoption | a citizens' initiative, a referendum | the same (Route A, 045) |
| The court | the programme stood | untested |
| The effect on the composition of voters | none | the main one |
5. What to take from it¶
A judicial precedent for the initiative route. The court held that a city may raise a tax and hand it to residents for their own political decision, and that this does not violate the rights of a dissenting taxpayer. For the US legal base (045) this is the closest decision there is: not reasoning about admissibility but a case won.
The path has been walked twice. An initiative, a referendum, two-thirds in favour, a court. The objection "this will not pass a referendum" is refuted on the weakest version of the idea — the one where the money goes not to the person but to a politician.
Oakland's lesson is about the source of the money. The programme was adopted by three-quarters of the votes and could not be launched on time: the budget had no money for it. This is an argument for writing the source of the payment into the text itself rather than leaving it to the executive (048g §3b). Seattle, with a dedicated levy, works; Oakland, without one, does not.
6. Weak point¶
The Elster decision concerns money that a citizen gives to a candidate, that is, it widens participation; the protocol pays for non-participation in voting, and the federal provision on payments for voting or refraining from it (52 U.S.C. §10307(c), 045) was not considered in that case. The precedent closes the question of the taxpayer and does not close the question of bribery. 🟡
Sources: Elster v. City of Seattle, Washington Supreme Court, No. 96660-5, 11.07.2019; Ballotpedia, "City of Seattle Initiative Measure No. 122 (November 2015)" and "Oakland, California, Measure W (November 2022)"; City of Seattle, Democracy Voucher Program; Brennan Center for Justice, case materials and programme evaluation, 2020.
Related: 016 (precedents of support) · 023 §23.2–23.3 (the summary table) · 045 (the US legal base, Route A) · 048g §3b (rollback locks: the source of the money) · 036 §85 (ten reforms) · 006b (predecessors)