The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Game Theory and Mathematics¶
Equilibria, the stability of the formula, attempts to play against the mechanism. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-GAM-001 · Four ways to kill the mechanism with one clause of law¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: legislators, legal drafters, institutional sceptics Source in the book: §42 "The poison pill", items 73.2–73.6 Related: Q-LEG-004, Q-ECO-002
Answer. Outright repeal is politically expensive, so the real attack is substitution of the code. §42 lists four vectors:
- Substituting general fund revenue for the source — the payment becomes hostage to the budget cycle and to bargaining.
- Substituting Census for the source — a soft, revisable estimate instead of hard W-2.
- Dilution through a composite index — "the median adjusted for…" turns the formula into a matter of discretion.
- Killing the automaticity — the payment remains but grows a barrier at the exit (an application, a check, a deadline), and actual availability falls.
The general principle of defence: the source, the coefficients and the automaticity are fixed in text adopted by referendum, and change only by a new referendum.
Weak point of the answer. The defence recognises the attacks but does not guarantee repelling them: everything turns on a court's readiness to read the text literally. A fifth vector — sabotage by execution with the law formally untouched — is not in the list.
Q-GAM-002 · Is there an equilibrium in which the mechanism collapses?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: academics, game theorists Source in the book: §13 "Game theory" — Downs, Buchanan-Tullock, Shapley, Nash, mechanism design; §15b.6b, 6d "The catharsis spiral"; §4.3b Related: Q-ELE-003, Q-GAM-003
Answer. §13 examines the mechanism within the standard apparatus and finds no internal contradiction. The "runaway" scenario in which this question was posed in the first edition — exit grows → the weight of the remaining grows → the gain from participation grows → some return → oscillation instead of equilibrium — describes not a breakdown but the mechanism's normal operation.
The architect's correction (21 September 2026): "the authorities will never be ideal, and there will always be sleepers and then an awakening. Under AB-EXIT there is always a balance: either aggrieved and took it, or indifferent and took the money, or aggrieved and voting. And so it swings forever, without an ideal, as in nature." The demand "prove the oscillations damp out" assumes that the goal is rest. The goal is a working feedback loop: a damped thermostat is a thermostat that has stopped responding. A collapse of the mechanism would look different — as the disappearance of one of the poles (nobody takes the sum, or nobody votes), not as oscillation between them.
Three structural limiters of amplitude are described in §15b.6d: the insensitive share (the indifferent take the sum under any government and do not respond to a campaign — §4.3b), the floating rate (D = M × 1.5 × K falls with the median, so as the economy worsens the payment does not become relatively more attractive) and the moving equilibrium point (the bar of demands rises — the trajectory is a spiral, not a circle, §15b.6b).
Weak point of the answer. A formal analysis of the dynamics across cycles is still absent, and remains desirable — not to prove damping but to estimate amplitude and period: it is unknown how much life must worsen for those who returned to take the sum again (§15b.6b). The practical price of the oscillation is named there too: a lag of one cycle — a bad government gets to serve out its term. Measured by a pilot.
Q-GAM-003 · Can the median be manipulated to raise or crash the payment?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: economists, mechanism-design specialists Source in the book: §2 — protection of the data source Related: Q-GAM-001, Q-ECO-002
Answer. The choice of W-2 via the SSA makes administrative manipulation of the source difficult (see Q-ECO-002). But the question of manipulating the median itself — through tax policy, the structure of employment or mass behaviour — has not been examined.
Weak point of the answer. The median is more robust than the mean, and that is good. But it is not invulnerable: a policy that shifts the structure of formal employment shifts it too. The attack is expensive and slow, but it formally exists. A section is needed.
Q-GAM-004 · Why exactly 1.5 % and K = 1 %, and not other numbers?¶
Status: 🔁 contested Who asks: academics, meticulous readers Source in the book: §1, §2, §3 "Rejected variants" Related: Q-ECO-001
Answer. §3 shows which variants of the formula were considered and why they were discarded, and §2 explains the meaning of the household multiplier 1.5 and the coefficient K = 1 %. The logic: the sum must be noticeable, but not so large as to become an offer that cannot be refused.
Weak point of the answer. "Noticeable but not decisive" is a qualitative criterion, and the specific numbers are calibrated for the US. The threshold at which the incentive becomes coercive (Q-ETH-004) is computed nowhere — so it cannot be shown that 1.5 % lies below it. The final values are set by referendum in any case, but the opening proposal needs better grounding.
Q-GAM-005 · You call the protocol incentive-compatible. Where is the theorem?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: academics, referees Source in the book: 013f "A Formal Statement" Related: Q-GAM-001, Q-GAM-002, Q-GAM-006
Answer. The word was imprecise: for Myerson it is a property of a mechanism with messages, while in the protocol nobody reports anything — the type shows in the act. Five statements are proved: "nothing" is dominated at any positive sum; the thermostat equilibrium exists and is unique (a fixed point of a decreasing map); exactly those with a stake above the threshold vote, and the exit share rises with the sum with damping; a stakeless person's vote cannot be bought for less than the sum; a group above the size threshold dissolves into individuals. Two assumptions: an impulse is not a stake, and money is worth the same to everyone (removed by replacing the stake with the stake in one's own money). The stake is defined as everything for which a person is willing to forgo the sum — the motive does not matter, the willingness to pay does.
Weak point of the answer. Uniqueness rests on the threshold depending on the exit share only through the weight of the vote; under herding there may be several points — the first thing a referee will check, and only a pilot can answer.
Q-GAM-006 · Feddersen and Pesendorfer proved that it pays the uninformed to abstain. Why pay, then?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: economists, voting theorists Source in the book: 013f §1b Related: Q-GAM-005, Q-ELE-002
Answer. Their theorem is the direct predecessor: the departure of the uninformed improves the decision. But their equilibrium does not arrive in life: a person does not consider himself uninformed, and he is brought in; he does not feel the gain of staying home. The protocol makes it tangible — as money. And the protocol's criterion is wider: theirs removes the uninformed, ours whoever has no horizon. The button at the election is a test of the horizon by an act: money now or influence on what comes later. Knowledge enters the stake as a component, not as a condition: whoever has a horizon and does not know stays and, having stayed, finds out, because he paid for his ticket.
Weak point of the answer. The claim "whoever stays will find out" rests on accuracy-incentive experiments and on those mobilised by an incentive; there is no direct measurement for those self-selected by stake.