The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Economics and Funding¶
Where the money comes from, how the formula works, what happens to the budget and inflation. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "trust" and "escrow" are the earlier wording: the budget pays under law. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-ECO-001 · Where does the money come from, and how much does it cost?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: economists, finance ministries, taxpayers Source in the book: §1 "The basic formula", §2 Related: Q-ECO-003, Q-LEG-004
Answer. The payment is not a fixed sum but a share of median income: D = M × 1.5 %, where M is the median from W-2 data via the SSA, the dividend coefficient K (not a dogma: chosen so that the sum is desirable for those who do not wish to vote; 1% is an illustration, see §1), the household multiplier 1.5. An independent trust fund pays it, automatically;
(Correction of 02.10.2026: "an independent trust fund", "W-2 via the SSA" and the multiplier 1.5 in this answer are the earlier wording. In force: D = p × M; the jurisdiction's budget pays under law; the payment is an unconditional obligation, the money is accumulated over the cycle and a targeted loan is raised if it falls short — 048m, Articles 2 and 8.) the sitting government can neither set nor change the amount. The key property is self-calibration: the economy grows → the sum grows, but citizens' incomes grow faster, so the incentive to exit weakens by itself.
Sums like "$200" in popular materials are an illustration, not a parameter. Specific values are set by referendum in the specific country or state.
Weak point of the answer. "Where does the money come from" and "how is the sum computed" are different questions, and the book is strong on the second. The source that fills the trust (a tax, a sovereign fund, redirection of existing spending on elections and party funding) is less developed than the formula itself. For a country without resource rent it is an open question.
Q-ECO-002 · Why W-2 via the SSA and not Census data?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: statisticians, policy designers Source in the book: §2, §42 item 73.3, §48 Related: Q-LEG-004, Q-IMP-001
Answer. W-2 is actually declared earned income, not a survey estimate. It correctly includes wages and correctly excludes pensions and transfers: the formula must rest on income from labour, otherwise it begins to drift with demography rather than with the economy. The self-employed are covered through 1099.
The second, more important motive is protection against substitution. A Census estimate is soft and revisable, easy to steer administratively. W-2 via the SSA is a hard source that is difficult to "tweak" without a visible trace. §42 names substituting Census for the source outright as one of four ways to kill the mechanism.
Weak point of the answer. The decision is US-centric. In a country with large informal employment there may be no analogue of W-2 at all, and then the source will have to be chosen afresh — with the same vulnerability to substitution that W-2 protected against.
Q-ECO-003 · Won't it drive inflation, like UBI?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: macroeconomists Source in the book: indirectly §20 "AB-EXIT is stronger than UBI", §14 Alaska PFD Related: Q-ECO-001
Answer. The book has no direct macroeconomic examination. The outline of the position: the volume of payments is an order of magnitude smaller than UBI, because only those who choose B receive it, and only once a cycle rather than monthly. The nearest empirical analogue is the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, where no noticeable inflationary effect was observed.
Weak point of the answer. The analogy with the Alaska PFD is limited: a small state with a resource fund and no electoral link to the payment. The inflationary effect for a large economy cannot be computed from it. A section is needed with a real estimate of payments relative to GDP at different exit shares.
Q-ECO-004 · The state pays those who do nothing. Isn't this an expansion of dependency?¶
Status: 🔁 contested Who asks: small-government advocates, right-wing critics Source in the book: §34 "The state as a corporation", §29.5 Related: Q-SOC-001, Q-ETH-003
Answer. The optics of the payment are different here. The state already pays parties for the votes they receive and already bears the costs of drawing in the non-voting. AB-EXIT redirects part of that money straight to the citizen — for a transparent refusal rather than silent apathy. It is not a new category of expenditure but a redirection of an existing one.
Weak point of the answer. The argument "the money is spent anyway" works for the election budget but does not cover the full volume of payments at a high exit share. If half the country chooses B, "redirection" no longer explains it — a separate source will be required. For now that is an assumption, not a calculation.
Q-ECO-005 · The state has lived on debt for decades and has not collapsed. So everything is fine?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: ordinary citizens, taxpayers, depositors Source in the book: §34 item 80.4a, §34 item 80.4, 056f Related: Q-ECO-003, Q-ECO-004
Answer. No. The citizen measures the state by himself, but the state has five instruments a family or a firm lacks: it prints its own currency, locks creditors in, raises income by decree, can fail to pay, and cannot be declared bankrupt. So it does not escape the reckoning; it shifts it onto business, households and regions. When the debt is held by its own citizens, a deposit is an IOU to oneself: it is backed by bonds, and the bonds by the same depositor's future taxes. Such a debt is settled by debasement, not repayment. The protocol does not take these instruments away from the state, but it gives the citizen a personal meter — the dividend, on which inflation is visible at once.
Weak point of the answer. The claim that the dividend makes money printing visible and therefore restrains it is so far logical rather than empirical: no country has tested it. Moreover, the strength of the five instruments varies: a country with debt in a foreign currency (Greece in the eurozone) lacks the first of them, and there the deception ends in default rather than inflation — how the reckoning comes depends on the country.