The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
An Inventory of Norms and Eleven Discrepancies: The Groundwork for a Single Charter¶
Chapter: 08 — Implementation File: 08_048k · v1 · 30 September 2026 (session 29.09.26) Source: the architect's decision "to close the gaps one by one"; the first gap of the roadmap (006b §5) — a text that can be adopted. A full inventory of normative provisions across all chapters (145 Russian files, 78 provisions) and a cross-check of the layers against each other. This is a handover document: it is not the charter but what the charter is assembled from. The architect's decisions on all the discrepancies were entered on 30.09.2026 (§3).
1. Why this section exists¶
The protocol's norms were written in different chapters at different times and on different occasions. A single text assembled without a cross-check would become one more layer on top of diverging ones. The section records three things: what is already written down as a norm and where; where the layers contradict each other; what skeleton the future charter has.
2. The inventory by topic¶
Each line is a norm as it stands in its source.
Formula and base. D = M × 1.5 × K (001, 004 §4.8). The household coefficient 1.5 is fixed, reviewed once a decade (002 §2.5, 049 sec. 4). M includes pay from an employer; pensions, benefits, investment income and alimony are excluded (002 §2.2). The efficiency bonus B = max(0, plan − actual) × 30 % / N, six months after the election and after an audit (004 §4.8, 049 sec. 6).
Data source. Administrative records, not a survey; independence from the executive; an open methodology; the calculation continues as long as at least one authorised body publishes (002 §2.1, 049 sec. 8). A divergence between sources above 10 % triggers an audit by a judicially appointed auditor with publication within 90 days (002 §2.3, 049 sec. 7). No local official may influence the variables of the formula (049 sec. 9). A recalculation rule for a change of methodology is written in advance (048g §3c).
Timing. The size of D is published 30 days before the election (003 §3.1). The declaration window opens early and closes as near to the election as possible, 5 days by default; the jurisdiction chooses the number (004 §4.1, 048j §2). An early declaration earns a premium of 5–10 % and immediate payment, financed from the late discount (004 §4.9). A late payment after the election to a person who neither took the sum nor voted comes at a discount (048i §5b). Payment is tied to the calendar of the cycle, not to the fact of an election being held (048g §3b). Once per cycle, not monthly (033c §5).
Who receives. A share for everyone without exceptions; every "except" only by referendum (004 §4.3c, 048g §3b). One-hundred-per-cent automatic enrolment, with no applications and no in-person procedures (042 §73.5, 001b §7). In money to a personal account, not in certificates or by set-off (048g §3b, 048h §6). Those without a smartphone collect in person on a document (048i §5c).
Protection of the dividend. Not subject to seizure, garnishment, withholding, pledge, assignment or set-off; not counted in assessing benefits; cannot serve as security for a loan; the exception is child support within limits set by a court (037, "Article N"). Not taxed (048g §3b).
Two buttons. A — I vote; B — I take the sum: a voluntary and reversible exit for one cycle, the right returns automatically (001b §0–1). (Note of 02.10.2026: "reversible" here means "at the next election"; within one election the exit is final — decision 7 in §3 and Article 5 of the charter.) There is no norm "a vote counts for three": each ballot counts as one, the weight arises from arithmetic (033c §9b). The vote of a person who took the sum is cancelled; a ballot in his name is a double spend, and the precinct answers for it, not the person (048f §4b–4c, 001c §3). The person who took the sum keeps all other rights (033c §1).
Two levels of decision. The rules — adoption, repeal, parameters — are decided by all citizens at a referendum, including those who took the sum; the managers are chosen by those who remain; the governing cohort cannot touch the dividend (048g §6b). Other referendums are not changed by the protocol (048g §6b).
Protection of the parameters. Five charter parameters: the source, the formula, automatic enrolment, a fresh choice every cycle, no approvals and no vetoes; changing any of them requires a new referendum (042 §73.6, 059e §3, 001b §7). Locks on the rollback gaps: counting D as income, payment other than in money, narrowing the circle, changing the methodology, obstructing the choice, cancelling elections (048g §3b). Open code, multi-signature, the right to fork (057c §6).
The counter. Daily throughout the window the numbers of A, B and undeclared are published, for every precinct, in machine-readable form, with no right of suspension; the counter is part of the referendum text (004 §4.7, §4.7b).
The count. The budget identity: the dividend budget = the number of B × D (048f §3.2). The precinct balance: records = votes + sums + silent (048i §5b). Three channels: the sum, the open vote with a token, the secret paper ballot — mandatory (048i §1). All tokens are published without names (048i §5c). The threshold of divergence between channels is written in advance; exceeding it means a re-run at the precinct for the paper channel (048i §5b, 048j §4).
Coercion and vote-buying. A notification to the person at the moment the sum is taken on his record, a period for contesting, a provisional ballot (048i §5c). Pressure on the choice is a criminal offence (037, 048h §6). Publication of the number of refusals of the sum by precinct and an anomaly threshold; the buyer is investigated, not the person; the choice itself is never grounds for suspicion (019d §4b).
Courts. Six disputes, deadlines in days, standing for everyone affected and for every candidate, open data as evidence by default; jurors by lot from outside the district of the dispute (048j §3–5).
The referendum. The sum and the formula in the text of the ballot (045 §45.7). No quorum (045 §45.7). The line: "both rights — to vote and not to vote — are preserved for ever; change is possible only by a new referendum" (045 §45.6).
3. Eleven discrepancies — the architect's decisions¶
All eleven were closed on 30 September 2026. The cross-cutting principle that settles half of them: the protocol gives the right to a payment as an incentive, not the methods of arranging it. The methods are a task for experts and for each country.
| # | Discrepancy | Decision |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The size of the payment | There is no sum — there is a percentage of the median income; for a country it turns into a sum, but it must be set as a percentage. Any that gives the result; the yardstick is that it be desirable to 40–50 % of the population |
| 2 | Who decides the percentage | First an open debate: the people with the populists pull towards the maximum, the economists towards the norm so as not to go bankrupt; "these will be the most epic debates in every country". Then a referendum, even with ten options; the procedure for choosing among several is worked out by lawyers and sociologists. The size itself is secondary: "the main thing is to launch with any", then correct by referendum in either direction. What matters is the change of paradigm. The council's power to change K (049, 002) is removed |
| 3 | How often to change | No more than once per cycle: "it should not be changed too fast, so as not to make a farce; there must be a cycle to evaluate the results". A simple majority. The eight-year cooling-off and the cap of 3 % of the budget (018 §34.6) are lifted |
| 4 | Which median and over what period | Not a norm of the protocol but a country setting: "a task for professional economists to find the balance". The charter keeps only the independence of the body that computes the median and an open methodology |
| 5 | Secrecy of exit | Secrecy is for the ballot. Exit from voting was never particularly hidden; there is no need to hide it specially, nor to push in that direction at the cost of the effectiveness of exit and of the money. Status is not published by name, precinct figures are visible; if protecting secrecy complicates getting the money, simplicity wins |
| 6 | When the money arrives | Precision of the incentive matters: chose — received at once and entered the counter at once. The early get a premium of 5–10 % on top; those who chose nothing get a late payment at a discount |
| 7 | Can one change one's mind | No. Took the money — exited for good. If a return were allowed there would be collusion: take the money en masse, then go and vote, and the count loses its meaning. The switching norm of 048h §6 is removed; against coercion there remain the notification, the period for contesting, the provisional ballot and the criminal offence |
| 8 | The late discount | 20–30 %, the exact number is found in a pilot |
| 9 | Who is entitled | "We do not change the voting system before adoption. Perhaps later." Everyone who has a vote today is entitled to the money. The question of the vote is in essence a question of taxes, and it was settled long ago: resident or non-resident, how long one must stay in the country; a paid vote lives by the same logic |
| 10 | The cycle and several elections | The cycle is the one the jurisdiction has today. Each level of government pays at its own elections from its own median and its own budget; the percentage is approved separately at each level |
| 11 | The bonus for budget savings | Removed. One payment for now. A second payment or spread payments (once a year instead of once a cycle) is a question of how the incentive is arranged, "once and much, or regularly but less"; for discussion and for experts |
A twelfth decision concerns the person who chose nothing (006b §6): he keeps his vote, and he is the controller. His money waits for him until the next election; by coming for it at any moment of the cycle he checks whether someone "voted" on his record. The witness against stuffing (048i §5b) works for the whole cycle, not for thirty days.
The thirteenth decision, of 02.10.2026, concerns the year in which the budget cannot pay (the audit's question, 040m §4): "the budget is accumulated for the next cycle over four years, or the city takes a loan for the purpose. The payment is to the city what taxes are to a person. Death and taxes: it must work both ways". The payment is an unconditional obligation of the jurisdiction: a citizen cannot tell the tax office he has no money — he saves or borrows; so too the jurisdiction before the citizen. A shortage of funds gives no right to reduce, defer or cancel the payment (048m, Article 8, paragraph 5). Two consequences: accumulation year by year makes the price of the rule visible every year rather than once per cycle; a loan provides a second thermostat — the creditors: too high a percentage shows at once in the price of debt, and a city that voted for it goes towards bankruptcy by the same road as a corporation that paid out too much in dividends (018 §34). The architect on the lawyers' part and on the fear of this norm: "yes, lawyers are needed, but it must be put to the referendum, and it is a rule; and bankrupt cities exist without the protocol too — there is nothing to fear here". The norm is therefore part of the text put to the referendum (048m, Article 15), and the comparison is with the present order, in which cities go bankrupt without any payment to voters (019).
The fourteenth decision, of 02.10.2026, concerns the period of the median. The check by roles (040m §5g) showed that the charter does not say whether the median is monthly or annual, and a finance officer cannot calculate by the formula D = p × M. The architect: "the data needed are for the last twelve months". The median is taken over the last twelve months for which data have been published; the percentage p refers to that annual quantity (048m, Article 2). Which income to count — earnings or all income — and how to average remains for economists. A calculation for a US city of a million residents is in 1e.
A proposal for the fifteenth decision, 07.10.2026 — who computes the median. The architect, in the Goldscheid reading (040o): the median is computed in order to collect taxes; understate it and taxes fall; "what we need is precisely a dependent, state-paid body". The consequence for the charter: Article 2, part 2, now requires a body independent of the executive, and the tax authority is part of it. The proposed replacement: "the median is computed by the body that collects taxes on income, from the same base and by the same method by which it collects them; the method is open". Independence is replaced by an opposite interest: understating the median costs the treasury more than it saves on the payment. The four requirements of 002 (reporting, regularity, cross-check, resilience) remain; only the second changes. The wording is confirmed by the architect; until then the charter is not amended.
By the same principle "the right, not the methods" two more questions of 006b §6 go to experts: whether to fix the percentage or a target exit share (the Dales fork), and whether to pay from a budget line or from a separate fund.
From the principle "we do not change the voting system" follows the answer to the gap about the seat formula (006b §5, item 7): mandates are counted as they are counted today; the protocol does not enter into it.
4. The skeleton of the charter¶
Fourteen articles, (the written charter 48m has sixteen and an annex; the title counts eleven discrepancies, and §3 holds thirteen decisions of the architect) each from existing norms, with the source number: the formula and the source; the percentage and its setting by debate and referendum; the window, immediate payment, the premium for the early; two buttons, the finality of exit and the cancelled vote; the person who chose nothing as the controller and the late payment until the next election; protection of the dividend; the counter; the status of exit and precinct figures; the budget identity and three channels; courts; coercion and vote-buying; two levels of decision and change no more than once per cycle; rollback locks; the ballot line and transitional provisions for a pilot. As a separate line — the principle "the right to a payment, not the methods". The target length is nine pages (006b §3, the Nakamoto row). Country settings — the median, the source of the money, the number of payments, the legal route — go in a separate annex at the end.
The text on this skeleton was written on 01.10.2026 — chapter 48m.
4b. The article "Sanctions" — a draft ladder after Ostrom¶
Ostrom's principle: violators are punished in steps — mildly the first time, harder on repetition, out for a system — and by the users themselves or by those accountable to them. The norms exist in the repository, each in its own section; here they are set in order. Nothing new is introduced.
The zero rung — the voters, without the legal part. The architect: "a power that cheats will at once be thrown in the bin by those who did not take the 700 dollars, or will be forced to justify and defend itself, and that too gives information to the voters." Those who remain forgo the sum for the vote, they have a horizon and a threefold weight; cheating before their eyes costs the power the next election without any court, and the self-justification is information in itself (035 §84.3: four responses of the power, all losing). And this applies to one's own: "the strategists can throw out even their own candidate on learning that he cheats; they do not want to win dishonestly — it is like in sport: a dishonest victory brings no glory". Whoever remained paid for taking part in a fair game, and his own candidate's rigging devalues his purchase; the candidate loses the insurance "our own will forgive", which today is free because the vote is free (029.10: the runner without a stopwatch — now with one). The architect's image: "it is like fans who clearly saw their player score with his hand and the team win because of it — even among themselves they will argue whether it really was the hand and whether the victory was honest. Nobody wants to support cheats." Today there is no such argument, because there are no fans — there are spectators who do not care who scored; whoever remains after the protocol is a fan who paid for his ticket, and the argument about the hand he will start himself, among his own. The legal ladder below is for what elections do not reach: a single commission, a single buyer, a single liar.
| Who | What | First time | Repeat | System |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A citizen | claimed "I did not vote" for the late payment, but voted (048i §5b) | return of the sum | a fine | as a false statement |
| A precinct commission | a ballot for someone who exited — a double spend (048f §4c) | a re-run at the precinct for the paper channel when the divergence threshold is exceeded (048i §5b, 048j §4) | dissolution of the commission | mass double counting — embezzlement of budget funds |
| A vote-buyer, a coercer | pressure on the choice, vote-buying (019d §4b, 048h §6) | the buyer investigated by money flows, not the person | criminal | — |
| The power | delayed the payment, stopped the counter, changed the methodology (048g §3b) | a court within days, standing for anyone affected, open data as evidence (048j §5) | automatic recalculation by a rule written in advance (048g §3c) | the referendum lock: repeal only by a vote against one's own money (048g §6b) |
| The data source | divergence from the control sources above 10 % (002 §2.3) | an audit by the judiciary, publication within 90 days | replacement of the source (the four-agency rule, 049 §8) | the calculation continues while at least one publishes |
Three of Ostrom's rules met here: the record and the precinct are punished, not the person — "the choice itself is never grounds for suspicion"; the users themselves watch — parallel counting, tokens, the person who chose nothing as the controller; the court is cheap and fast — 048j.
5. Weak point¶
The inventory was compiled by reading everything, but the sorting "norm or argument" is a judgement: some provisions stand in their sources as a move in a dispute rather than as an article, and in assembling the charter each will have to be reworded. Five of the twelve decisions hand the question to experts — the median, the choice among several percentages, the number of payments, price or quantity, fund or budget; the charter will be short precisely because those answers are not in it, and the first critic will call them blanks. 🟡
Related: 006b (the roadmap) · 049 (the municipal statute, Article X) · 004 §4.7 (Article XIV) · 042 (the poison pill, five parameters) · 048f (double entry) · 048g (rollback) · 048i (three channels) · 048j (courts) · 037 (protection of the dividend) · 001c (the forks)