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The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

Detonators: the British Scenario and the Profile of the Arsonist

Chapter: 08 — Implementation: Universal Principles File: 08_046 · v1 · 12 June 2026 (sessions 34–35)

How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.

46.1. The role of the detonator

In countries without a citizen-initiative mechanism (the United Kingdom is the model case) a campaign cannot lead to adoption directly — it produces discourse: throws the term into the language, forces the political class to speak, shifts the window. The detonator is not the bearer of §41: the bearer builds, the detonator sets the conversation alight. Profile: a public figure with a name, media talent and a closed career ladder — nothing to lose, a topic needed. The market of such figures in fragmented polities is overcrowded (in Britain 2026: fragments of the right flank, independents, last-term backbenchers).

46.2. Why the topic self-reproduces in the media

Political content is boring; AB-EXIT is an ideal story by the laws of the genre: every viewer has a personal interest (the sum in the headline — "for me?"), an opinion without preparation, endless formattability (street polls "would you take it?", calculators, debates, reactions). Outraged coverage spreads just as approving coverage does (the Brexit-2016 rule). Platform algorithms are indifferent to civic value — they see retention, and for content "you are owed money" it is biologically maximal. The only killer strategy — silence — breaks at the first utterance: after that silence itself becomes the story.

46.3. The detonator's weapon: a question, not a programme

The detonator does not campaign for the mechanism — he asks a question: "Parties are paid for your vote from the budget. Channels — for advertising to you. You — zero. Why?" Against a programme the system knows how to fight (fact-checks, counter-promises, lawyers); against a question — not: it cannot be refuted, banned or outbid; one can answer it (all answers are self-exposure, see 46.4) or keep silent (silence after a question has been asked is also an answer). Historical precedents of battering-ram questions: "Bread and peace"; "Am I not a man and a brother?" (abolitionism — the gentleman in the drawing room had no decent answer); the suffragettes' question. In all cases the mechanism of the solution came afterwards — the system was broken by a question working in every listener's head round the clock and for free. Consequence for sequence: question → erosion → the system itself asks for a mechanism — and AB-EXIT at that moment lies ready: the only answer on the market, with a formula, a charter, protections.

46.4. Four unspeakable answers

A politician's attempts to explain to the voter why he does not need a dividend:

  1. Fiscal: "an irresponsible expense" — from the mouth of a system spending more on itself (party subsidies, apparatus) it sounds like "discipline is when the money doesn't reach you".
  2. Sacred: "the vote is holy, it is not sold" — but nothing is being taken from the voter; the politician is forced to defend the mandatory gratuitousness of someone else's silence.
  3. Paternalistic: "they'll vote with their wallet, not their reason" — an admission that targeted advertising for millions is "reason", while money to the voter is "wallet" (§29 live on air).
  4. Honest: "we'll lose the funding for your votes, and the outcome will be decided by those who are harder to fool" — true and therefore unspeakable.

Every answering opponent is a canvasser for the campaign. A clip of a mumbling official is the main artefact of the detonation.

46.5. The petition as a machine for compelling speech

The mechanics of parliament.uk: 100K signatures = a mandatory debate in Westminster Hall. The system's record is a million in a day (peaks ~2,000/min); with a synchronous launch (evening peak + broadcast + reposts) 100K is achievable in an hour or an hour and a half, conservatively in 6–12 hours, and the speed itself becomes the second story. The debate is legally a dead end (90 minutes, a junior minister, "we have no plans"); politically a triple machine: (1) officials for the first time are obliged to answer the question aloud — production of the clips of 46.4; (2) the transcript = a map of potential interceptors and bearers (who did not say "no"); (3) a refusal after a record petition = the second act: "a million signatures — 90 minutes was enough for them to say no; to themselves they never once said no". The petition's KPIs: not signatures (guaranteed) but speed to 100K, a total of a million, the names of those who did not say no, one clip of refusal.

"A referendum from below is impossible" is formally true and practically false: the British constitution is a membrane permeable to electoral fear. The Brexit referendum was provided for by nothing — it was produced by UKIP's pressure with 35–45 % support for leaving; the Scottish one of 2014 likewise. The arsenal (advisory status, 18-month commissions, amendments to wording, references to the Representation of the People Act, the Treasury's prerogative) gives 12–24 months of delay — and every item, translated into the voter's language, becomes a campaign poster: "lawyers on £200K/year are spending two years studying whether you can be given £700"; "the law forbids paying you — paying parties for your votes it does not forbid". The section's formula: at 40 % support lawyers explain to the people the impossibility; at 80 % they explain to parliament the drafting; the profession is one, the opinions differ. The tipping threshold historically is 35–45 % given a threat-party; at 80 % (see 08_045) the only question is whose signature is on the bill.

46.7. Precedents of explosive "money" topics

— Grillo / M5S: a comedian with a formally closed entrance to parliament; reddito di cittadinanza → 33 % and Italy's first party (2018); in the south on polling day people asked where to collect the money. The historical maximum of the effect "marginal + direct money". — Andrew Yang: a nobody with a Freedom Dividend of $1,000/month → within a year a national figure; the idea outlived the campaign and legitimised direct payments in the US mainstream. — Stimulus cheques with Trump's signature: a physical payment with a politician's name — the strongest political medium in US history; understood by power. — Winter fuel (UK): the removal of £300 from pensioners nearly toppled the government in six months — until the retreat. If minus 300 produces an earthquake, plus 700 by a non-removable formula produces one with the opposite sign; a ready contrast for the campaign: "they took £300 from your grandparents — I propose a law under which taking it away will be impossible".

The general law: direct money in hand is the only topic guaranteed to break through apathy; and every time it has lifted outsiders, because insiders cannot offer it (§39: "no sitting politician will offer it first" — Grillo and Yang proved it in deed).

Related: §29 · §39 · §40 · §41 · 08_045 (campaign economics) · 08_047 (zugzwang, cases of the pair of bearers) · 08_048 (the weapon of the question — a universal theory of spread)