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The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

7. Liquid Democracy Through the Dividend

Chapter: 02 File version: v1 Date: 2026-06-11 Source: v6.53 §17, §18

How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: the efficiency bonus has been removed. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.

17.1. There are no permanent categories

A common error in analysing AB-EXIT is dividing citizens into permanent categories: "the apathetic always take the money", "the angry always vote", "the contented always take". In reality there are no permanent categories. Every citizen is a variable that changes state every cycle depending on one figure: the dividend.

One and the same person over six cycles:

  • Cycle 1: Apathetic — takes ₪1,800 (everything is fine, who cares)
  • Cycle 2: Apathetic — takes ₪1,600 (a bit less, oh well)
  • Cycle 3: Angry — votes! (the dividend fell to ₪1,200; ₪600 vanished = a month of food)
  • Cycle 4: Contented — takes ₪1,800 (the new mayor raised the dividend)
  • Cycle 5: Strategist — votes to protect the good mayor (sees a threat from an opponent)
  • Cycle 6: Apathetic — takes ₪2,000 (everything is stable)

Six cycles — six states. Not a "personality type" but a REACTION to a result. Like body temperature: not "you are a hot person" but "you are at 39 °C right now because of an infection".

17.2. The dividend as a universal alarm clock

The key observation: "eternal apathetics" do not exist. The apathetic person is indifferent to POLITICS, not to MONEY. AB-EXIT turns politics into money, so when the dividend falls EVERYONE wakes up — including those who have never in their lives taken an interest in elections.

Four levels of awakening:

  • The dividend grows (+15 %): everyone sleeps, the mayor works. Correct.
  • The dividend stagnates (0 %): some start thinking. Amber light.
  • The dividend falls (−10 %): the majority wakes up, the angry vote, the contented decide whether to defend the mayor or join the angry. Red light.
  • The dividend collapses (−25 %): EVERYONE is awake, EVERYONE votes, including former apathetics. The mayor is finished.

A former apathetic woken by a falling dividend is the most dangerous voter for a mayor. There are many of them (the former majority), they are sudden (the mayor is used to their sleeping), and they are angry not from ideology but over MONEY — the most concrete motivation there is.

17.3. The contented come to vote too

Another error: "the contented always take the money". The contented person CALCULATES: "₪1,800, or protecting the mayor who gave me a job worth ₪528,000 over four years?" If there is a threat (the angry may bring down a good mayor), the contented person COMES TO DEFEND. Not from habit — from arithmetic.

This means a good mayor is PROTECTED from unjust removal: his contented voters activate under threat, like an immune system. AB-EXIT is not a filter (static) but democracy's immune system (dynamic): it sleeps in health, wakes in illness, and mobilises fully in a serious infection.

17.4. Personal, not party, democracy

AB-EXIT creates a fundamentally new type of electoral behaviour: citizens flow between the PERSONS of mayors, not between PARTIES.

The reason: the dividend is tied to the result of the CITY, and the city is the responsibility of the MAYOR, not of a party. Dividend $570 → $700 means "Mayor Johnson did well", not "the Democrats did well". Dividend $700 → $500 means "Mayor Johnson failed", not "the Democrats failed". In Cleveland the dividend rose under the same state, the same economy, the same pandemic — but a DIFFERENT mayor. So it is not about the party or the circumstances but about the PERSON.

This makes hiding behind a party brand impossible: a Democratic mayor cannot say "the Republicans are to blame" if in the neighbouring city a Republican mayor showed dividend growth under the same external conditions.

AB-EXIT replaces party loyalty ("I am a Democrat forever") with personal accountability ("I am for whoever raised my dividend"). At the municipal level this turns elections from an ideological ritual into an assessment of a specific manager by a specific result.

18.1. The problem of short-term thinking in current democracy

Without AB-EXIT a mayor faces a dilemma: build a factory for $50M (payoff in 3–4 years, 1,000 jobs) or build a park for $5M (visible at once, votes now). The inert electorate (70 %) chooses the park. The mayor chooses the park. The city stagnates for decades.

18.2. Why a motivated electorate supports strategy

With AB-EXIT, 46,000 voters = 100 % motivated. Each has PAID $570 for the right to decide. That is not a "voter" — that is an INVESTOR. An investor understands: losing a $150 bonus now to get $290 in four years = ROI 93 %. The inert electorate wants the park NOW. The motivated electorate approves the factory over FOUR YEARS.

The strategist mayor under AB-EXIT:

Address to the council: "Citizens, the bonus this cycle will be $0. Because I am investing $50M in a factory. In three years: 1,000 jobs, median +8 %, dividend +$90, projected bonus $200+. I am asking you to invest a $150 bonus now for $290 later. Here are the calculations. Here is the contract. Check it on the portal."

46,000 motivated voters: "ROI 93 %. Approved."

18.3. Mechanisms protecting the strategist mayor

The three-year moving average (section 2) protects the dividend base from short-term dips: one year of investment spending will not crash a three-year average. The BONUS falls (short-term), not the BASE (long-term).

The SMS with an explanation (section 10): the citizen sees not merely "bonus $0" but the REASON — "$50M invested in a factory, expected effect: +1,000 jobs, +8 % median". Context prevents blind rage.

Comparison with neighbours: "Cleveland bonus $95, stable but NOT GROWING. Detroit bonus $0, but a factory is being built." The citizen sees: stability vs growth. The motivated choose growth.

18.4. Strategic reforms that are IMPOSSIBLE without AB-EXIT

Examples of reforms an inert electorate would block and a motivated one would approve:

  • Closing a loss-making municipal enterprise (200 jobs lost → 2,000 jobs created in three years)
  • Zoning reform (short-term: construction chaos; long-term: an influx of business)
  • Investment in education (payoff in 5–10 years, invisible now)
  • Welfare reform (short-term: complaints from recipients; long-term: former recipients = taxpayers)

Each of these reforms loses to "the $5M park" under an inert electorate. And wins under a motivated one.