The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Electoral Dynamics¶
What happens to turnout, vote weight and the party balance. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one; a "reversible" choice means "at the next election": within one election exit is final. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-ELE-001 · Isn't this legalising apathy?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: academics, commentators Source in the book: §29.1–29.3 Related: Q-LEG-002, Q-ETH-002
Answer. About 48 % of voters in mature democracies already do not participate — and the academic community treats this as the norm, calling it "structural apathy" but not a crisis. After AB-EXIT the situation is structurally the same: the same people do not participate. Two things change — non-participation becomes a transparent, recorded choice and it becomes compensated.
That is the structural hypocrisy of the criticism: one and the same situation is judged oppositely depending on whether it is a silent norm or a formalised choice.
Weak point of the answer. The symmetry "the same people" is a hypothesis, not a fact. The presence of a payment may draw out of the electorate people who today do vote. How large that additional outflow is remains unknown until a pilot, and the strength of the whole argument depends on exactly that.
Q-ELE-002 · Who gains from AB-EXIT — the left or the right?¶
Status: 🔁 contested Who asks: campaigns, political technologists, journalists Source in the book: §20, §22 "The consensus theme", §17 Related: Q-LEG-001, Q-ELE-003
Answer. The book's position: AB-EXIT is a consensus theme, not a wedge. It gives no lasting advantage to either camp, because those who leave are not a party's supporters but weakly motivated voters from all camps at once. The remaining electorate shifts from ideologues to pragmatists — and that changes not the winner but the type of politician for whom winning pays.
Weak point of the answer. This is the most politically loaded question in the base, and "nobody wins" is an answer neither side will believe. Until there is a calculation on real data for a specific jurisdiction, every party will assume the mechanism is aimed against it. That is a practical rather than a logical problem — but it can kill the launch.
Q-ELE-003 · If only the motivated remain, won't the radicals be strengthened?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: political scientists — a strong objection Source in the book: partly §17, §21 "The centrist void" Related: Q-ELE-002, Q-GAM-002
Answer. The book claims the opposite: those who leave are not centrists but the indifferent, and the centre is precisely what acquires a targeted agenda it lacks today. But there is as yet no systematic answer to the scenario "radicals are more strongly motivated than moderates, so their share grows".
Weak point of the answer. The objection rests on an observed regularity: when turnout falls, the share of the ideologically motivated usually rises (US primaries are a live example). The answer "the centre will get an agenda" is a hope, not a mechanism. A section is needed.
Q-ELE-004 · The one who took the money lost influence — hasn't he lost?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: citizens, the public Source in the book: §1, §11 Related: Q-ETH-001
Answer. He exchanged influence he was not using anyway for money — consciously and reversibly. The mirror side matters more: whoever refused the payment receives a mathematically strengthened vote. If half exit, every remaining vote weighs twice as much. For the first time, refusing money converts into measurable political influence rather than moral satisfaction.
Weak point of the answer. The strengthening of weight is real, but it is not distributed evenly by intensity of preference: it benefits most those who already have more resources for political participation. The mechanism is neutral; access to the use of the strengthened vote is not.
Q-ELE-005 · Australia has fined non-voters for a hundred years and all is well. How is the protocol better than compulsory voting?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: supporters of compulsory voting, political scientists Source in the book: 023c "Compulsory Voting" Related: Q-ELE-001, Q-SOC-004
Answer. The same lever with the opposite sign. A $20 fine has kept turnout above 90 % for a century — a small price steers mass behaviour, an argument for "launch with any percentage". But full turnout does not cure the horizon: pensions rose right after 1924, an attempt to touch retirees' concessions was punished in 2019, housing in Sydney costs 13.8 annual incomes, trust in parliament has not risen in a quarter of a century. Next to its twins — New Zealand and Canada without compulsion — the only measurable result of the fine is the turnout figure. Australia shows what happens when everyone is driven to the ballot box: power for the middle of everyone, including the third that does not care. The protocol leads that third out with money. Fowler measured that adding the third shifted policy by 7–10 points — a mirror lower bound for the protocol's effect.
Weak point of the answer. Compulsion in Australia is combined with preferential voting, and the parties' centrism may be a consequence of the latter; their contributions cannot be separated on one country.
Q-ELE-006 · People will never vote for money at elections — Arizona rejected a voter lottery two to one.¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: campaign staffs, journalists Source in the book: 023f "Money at Elections", 059c Related: Q-LEG-001, Q-ELE-002
Answer. In 2006 Arizona rejected the purchase of turnout by lottery from a private person — the opposite of the protocol: paid for coming, to a random person, as a gimmick. In twenty years the taboo was lifted by practice: Musk's million-a-day draw before the 2024 election was not stopped by the court, and the candidate won; in 2026 the sitting president promised five thousand to everyone. The word "bribery" was uttered every time, and every time it cost less. The protocol does not need to prove that money is admissible — it needs to prove that its money goes for refusal, not for a vote, to everyone, by a formula. Field experiments also give a threshold: small sums do not move behaviour.
Weak point of the answer. The three events come from one country; there has not yet been a referendum on payment for exit anywhere.