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The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

32. The Fragmentation of the Tech Elite as Mobilisation Potential

Chapter: 06 — Structural Hypocrisy and the Arsenal of the Elites File version: v1 Date: 10 June 2026

32.1. The current splits of the tech elite

Besides the division into B1 and B2 (see §31), the tech elite has one more important structural characteristic: they are now politically fragmented and have no common unifying project.

The current picture of splits:

  • Musk vs Altman — a public feud over OpenAI and xAI
  • Andreessen vs Hoffman — Andreessen backed Trump in 2024, Hoffman funded the Democrats
  • Thiel vs Khosla — different political camps
  • Peter Thiel vs Sam Altman — different positions on AI regulation
  • Musk vs Satya Nadella (Microsoft) — competition for the AI narrative
  • Armstrong (Coinbase) vs Warren — different approaches to financial systems

32.2. The structural weakness of fragmentation

The tech elite has no common political project under which they could unite. The old elite has Davos, Bilderberg, the CFR, Brookings — institutional platforms. The tech elite has practically none of this.

32.3. Five reasons why AB-EXIT can become the unifying project

1. AB-EXIT is non-partisan by nature. Structural mechanism design, not an ideological programme. Andreessen (right), Hoffman (Democrat), Khosla (centrist), Altman (liberal technocrat) can support it without an obligation to accept anyone else's ideology.

2. AB-EXIT protects their common interests. All suffer from populist volatility. One crisis in the USA/Europe devalues their assets by tens of billions. AB-EXIT gives a common solution.

3. AB-EXIT is in their own cultural paradigm. Mechanism design, game theory, structural redesign — the native language of all of them. This is not "politics" — it is "an engineering task of system design", which they understand better than political scientists.

4. AB-EXIT gives everyone a concrete role. Andreessen can write essays on Substack. Hoffman can organise meetings with politicians. Khosla can fund a pilot referendum. Cuban can run a media campaign. Armstrong can work with the crypto community. This is a division of labour under a single project, not a fight for the leader's chair.

5. AB-EXIT gives them a collective legacy. Each is already a billionaire. What do they need next? Not more money — a legacy. AB-EXIT as "the mechanism we carried through together in 2026–2028 that fixed democracy" is a historical legacy of the order of the invention of the telephone, the internet, container shipping. The glory is distributed among them, not concentrated on one.

32.4. Launch strategy — not from above but through a coordination moment

Do not try to organise the tech elite from above. Launch the project so that they themselves see the possibility of coordination.

The dynamics:

  1. The first anchor supporter (Andreessen or Khosla) starts a public discussion through Substack or a podcast
  2. The second (Hoffman) responds, sees that Andreessen supports it, understands the project is non-partisan
  3. The third (Altman or Armstrong) joins, sees there are already two supporters
  4. The coordination moment — everyone sees that the others support it, they join en masse
  5. A movement arises that is already hard to stop

This is the classic dynamic of network effects — every subsequent joining raises the value of participation for the rest.

32.5. An additional effect — legitimisation for class A

When the tech elite (B1) unanimously supports the reform, the academics of class A can no longer keep calling it "marginal". AB-EXIT gains a legitimacy that spreads back to class A.

This is a double effect — mobilising B1 simultaneously weakens A's resistance. One right move gives two results.

32.6. A ready substantive letter for class B1 (template)

Subject: AB-EXIT — a structural solution for democracy (a 30-minute call?)

Dear [Andreessen / Khosla / Hoffman / Altman / Cuban / Armstrong / Collison],

I am writing with a concrete proposal — not for investment, not for a donation, not for an endorsement. For a 30-minute conversation about structure.

Context. I analysed the arsenal of tools for fighting populist volatility. RCV gives 3–5 %. Open primaries — 5–8 %. Compulsory voting — 25–35 % turnout, but zero effect on quality. All existing mechanisms give single-digit percentages.

This explains your public position on [a specific case — Trump 2024 / Brexit / Alaska RCV / other]. The available tools do not scale.

I have developed a mechanism design called AB-EXIT. By model estimates — a 20–40 % structural effect on the key parameters. Stress-tested with 6 AI models (449+ rounds, 0 contradictions). Empirical base — the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (50 years, 100 % participation). Formal foundation — Hurwicz–Maskin–Myerson mechanism design.

This is not a tactical reform. It is the fifth class of institutional relations between the state and the citizen.

I am not asking for money or an endorsement. I ask for 30 minutes of your time for a critical review of the structure. If you find a structural contradiction — I will take it into account. If not — you will have a working model for fixing democracy that can become your collective legacy.

Documentation: https://ab-exit.org · github.com/Denis-Kliavlin/ab-exit

Respectfully, Denis Kliavlin denis@ab-exit.com

The template is adapted for each recipient — the specific public cases he reacted to, his public positions on democracy, his investments connected with the topic.

Related sections: - §31 — The split of the elites A/B1/B2 (the theoretical base of this strategy) - §30 — The arsenal of the reasonable elites (the context of why existing tools do not work) - §23 — Quantitative comparison (precise figures for the letter) - §13 — Game theory (for the tech audience as scientific foundation)

Source: written in the claude.ai chat, session 31, as §97.10 in v6.55. The concept of the "coordination moment" is the session's key strategic discovery. Moved to file 06 in v6.56_clean.