The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
The Poor Man as the Most Expensive Voter: Splitting the Demand for Money and for Justice¶
Chapter: 04 — Electoral Dynamics (paired with §19) File: 04_019b · v1 · 12 August 2026 (session 37)
19b.1. Methodological correction: poor ≠ destitute ≠ dumbed-down¶
Three axes it is forbidden to glue together: income, cognition, information. The poor man (working, counting every penny) is a person whose arithmetic and local awareness are above average, because his life depends on them: he sees theft in details inaccessible to a sociologist — whose son-in-law holds the contract for the road being laid for the third time; the estimate for the school repair against the price of a repair in the shop. Poverty is a deficit of money and leverage, often with a surplus of knowledge about the mechanics of theft around. The destitute (marginality, disconnection from the social fabric) — a small separate category. The dumbed-down (consumer of propaganda) — a category on the information axis, distributed across all incomes. A model in which "the poor man cannot count" is factually wrong and insulting: he tells one loaf from two better than the finance minister, and he counts "stolen/not stolen" by his own yard.
19b.2. Justice as a currency: the ultimatum game¶
Behavioural economics (§14): justice is not a luxury of the well-fed but a basic currency. The ultimatum game, replicated in dozens of countries: people burn their own money to punish an unfair split — and the more readily, the more insulting the split. The poor man lives inside an insulting split every day — he has the highest accumulated demand for justice in the country. He takes his own (the dividend — a lawful share, hence 93–97 % acceptance) and burns the unjust (the protest vote). These actions come from one motivation and do not compete.
19b.3. The honest man's programme: "stop doing", not "do"¶
A verifiably honest politician does not need to promise to build — his programme is negative: "I will stop stealing" + proof by knowledge (the scheme, the contract, the son-in-law). The unique properties of this genre: (a) instant verification by the listener against his own map of the yard — the poor man is the hardest listener to lie to: one would have to lie about his yard; (b) it requires no faith in competence ("I'll double GDP" — unverifiable; "I'll stop stealing" — verified by the dividend a year later); (c) arithmetic honesty automatically: if the leak is real, stopping it is exactly the doubling of the loaf. The bar is brilliantly low: any non-thief can clear it — competition among the honest is possible, among thieves it is not (their "we're for justice too" breaks on the son-in-law with the contract).
19b.4. Button B as a waiting room; B→A conversion¶
When an honest man appears, the poor split not into "took/didn't take" but into conscious strategies: thirst for justice active (60–70 % of the poor — angry every day): for the verifiably honest, 70–85 % in the first cycle; "tired, trust nobody" (25–30 %): first cycle — the dividend (a waiting room: he sits with the money until someone's plan matches his map of the yard), B→A conversion in the second cycle after a number has been shown: +50–60 %; structurally bought (state employees under the herd, clientele, 10–15 %): both retention tools are dead (the white payment beat the buckwheat, "I chose the dividend" is a lawful excuse against the herd) — half into the dividend, half vote like the first layer.
Result: first cycle — 45–55 % of the poor for the verifiably honest (at their former turnout of 30–40 %!), second cycle after the shown number — 65–75 %. With weight ×2+ this is the core of the honest man's coalition — not because he gave them something, but because he coincided with their knowledge and gave them back their own.
Symmetry against the manipulator: the television is beaten by the loaf (in the conflict "television vs the loaf in hand" the loaf always wins — the level of perception is below the reach of propaganda), the buckwheat is beaten by the lawful payment, fear by the lawful excuse. The poor man turns from the cheapest voter of the current system into the most expensive: his vote is bought only by a plan coinciding with his knowledge of the yard. The most anti-elitist consequence of the mechanism.
19b.5. Splitting the demand¶
Today the poor man has one gesture for everything — the protest vote for the populist: "give money" and "punish the thieves" are packed into one tick, which the populist eats without delivering anything. AB-EXIT splits the demand: money is satisfied by button B (guaranteed, by law, immediately — and struck out of political bargaining), justice remains the only content of button A. Politics is for the first time purified down to its real subject: not "who will give money" (everyone gives — the mechanism), but "who does not steal" (verifiable by the dividend).
Street register: "The law pays you the money now. The vote stays for justice — for the first time only for it."
Related: §14 (ultimatum) · §17 · §19 (apathetic/burned) · 02_011b (waiting room = a stage of therapy) · 048b (correction to "dumbed-down") · 045 (campaign) · §15 · 10_056c